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Caron, Carter and Bedford at the
Supreme Court of Canada: Society
Can Change But History Will Always
Stay the Same
Nicolas M. Rouleau*

I. INTRODUCTION
Good facts make good law. And at the Supreme Court of Canada,
good social and legislative facts can change the law. Between December
2013 and November 2015, the Supreme Court released Bedford,1
Carter,2 and Caron,3 three decisions that ruled on the same three
constitutional issues the Court had ruled on 20 to 30 years earlier. In the
Prostitution Reference,4 Rodriguez,5 and Mercure,6 the “first versions” of
each case, the Court had refused to find in favour of the claimants.
Neither the factual records nor the interpretation of the relevant
provisions allowed the Court to establish the existence of their
constitutional rights.

*
Appellate and constitutional litigator in Toronto. I would like to thank the participants
and organizers of the Osgoode Law School annual Constitutional Cases Conference and the SCLR
reviewer for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1
Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72, [2013]
3 S.C.R. 1101, at para. 48 (S.C.C.), varg [2012] O.J. No. 1296 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Bedford,
SCC”].
2
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R.
331, at para. 42 (S.C.C.), revg [2013] B.C.J. No. 2227 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Carter, SCC”].
3
Caron v. Alberta, [2015] S.C.J. No. 56, 2015 SCC 56, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 511, at para. 82
(S.C.C.), affg [2014] A.J. No. 174 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Caron, SCC”].
4
Reference re Criminal Code, Canada, ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.), affg [1987] M.J. No. 453 (Man. C.A.) [hereinafter “Prostitution
Reference, SCC”].
5
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R.
519 (S.C.C.), affg [1993] B.C.J. No. 461 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”].
6
R. v. Mercure, [1988] S.C.J. No. 11, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234 (S.C.C.), revg [1985] S.J.
No. 766 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter “Mercure, SCC”].
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In Bedford, Carter and Caron, new claimants took new kicks at the
can. At trial in these cases, the claimants took advantage of recent
favourable legal developments. More importantly, they filed heaps of new
historical and social science evidence in support of their claims. Seizing
upon this new evidence, the trial judges in the cases made findings of
social and legislative facts — “that is, facts about society at large,
established by complex social science evidence”7 — that convinced them
to overturn the existing Supreme Court precedents.
On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether
the trial judges’ factual and legal conclusions could indeed overrule the
Court’s previous holdings. In two of those cases, Bedford and Carter, the
Court upheld the trial results and granted the claims, holding that a
lower court can revisit the decision of a higher court “if new legal issues are
raised as a consequence of significant developments in the law, or if there is
a change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the
parameters of the debate”.8 Importantly, the Court professed itself
constrained by the trial judges’ findings of social and legislative facts.
In the third case, Caron, the Court ignored the trial judge’s findings
of social and legislative fact and instead emphasized the “important
element of context to bear in mind that if the appellants are right, the
result reached by the Court in Mercure is clearly wrong. The stability of
our constitutional law counsels against accepting such a proposition too
readily.”9 It dismissed the claim.
Part II of this article reviews the Court’s decisions in the Prostitution
Reference/Bedford, Rodriguez/Carter, and Mercure/Caron cases. In each
of these pairs, the Supreme Court’s commitment to deference on social
and legislative facts was tested on a claim to overturn one of its
precedents. In only two of these pairs, however, did the Supreme Court
defer to the trial judge.
Part III examines two reasons why the Court may have refused to
defer to the trial judge in Caron. First, the case brought back to the
surface the Supreme Court’s underlying unease with minority-language
rights. While the Court has affirmed that constitutional language rights
are to be interpreted broadly and purposively, like other constitutional
rights, the Court has consistently refused to do so outside of the limited

7
8
9

Bedford, SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 48.
Id., at para. 42.
Caron, SCC, supra, note 3, at para. 82.
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section 23 Charter10 context. Expanding the right to legislative bilingualism
is left to the political sphere. Second, the historical facts at play in Caron
are different from the usual social and legislative facts considered by the
Court. Social and legislative facts are used to bring constitutional
legal norms more in line with society; historical facts, on the other hand,
are used to undermine the modern-day societal and constitutional
understanding. The Court is therefore more inclined to accept new social
facts than new historical facts.

II. ONE OF THESE IS NOT LIKE THE OTHER
1. Prostitution
(a) 1990 — The Prostitution Reference
In the Prostitution Reference, in 1990, the Supreme Court debated
for the first time the constitutionality of two prohibitions related to
prostitution: the prohibition on bawdy-houses and the prohibition on
communicating in public to engage in prostitution or obtain the services
of a prostitute.11 Specifically, the Court assessed whether they infringed
sections 2(b) and 7 of the Charter.
The matter arose as a reference through the Manitoba Court of
Appeal; it thus had no trial record. In any event, a record may not have
mattered. As Monnin C.J.M. insisted, “[t]he issue is so simple and plain
that it does not require numerous volumes of transcripts of testimony
from social scientists, behavioural experts or moralists for that matter,
and clogged dockets to reach a sane and reasonable conclusion on that
single issue”. The four other justices agreed. Only Philp J.A. referred
to any social and legislative facts about prostitution — vague platitudes
pulled out of thin air. The court resoundingly confirmed the constitutionality
of the two prohibitions. For Monnin C.J.M., section 7 of the Charter had
“absolutely nothing to do with prostitution”. Neither did section 2(b):
“I must express my astonishment and surprise that some counsel and
even some courts would so think. That argument only serves to trivialize

10
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
11
Prostitution Reference, SCC, supra, note 4.
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the great concept of the Charter.” The other justices were no kinder in
their assessments of the merits.12
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the
constitutionality of the prohibitions. Writing for the majority on section 7
of the Charter, Dickson C.J.C. agreed that the prohibitions could deprive
individuals of their liberty and security of the person upon conviction, by
imprisoning them. While he agreed that “vagueness” should be recognized
as a principle of fundamental justice, the prohibitions at issue were not
“so vague as to violate the requirement that the criminal law be clear”.
Given the benefit of judicial interpretation, the meaning of “prostitution”,
“keeps” a bawdy-house, “communicate”, and “attempts to communicate”
could be discerned in advance. Chief Justice Dickson also agreed that the
prohibition on communications infringed section 2(b) of the Charter, but
found it was justified under section 1.13
(b) 2013 — Bedford
The Ancient Greeks believed that history was cyclical. At the
Supreme Court, one cycle lasts just over 20 years. In 2013, the Court
once again addressed the constitutionality of the regime surrounding
prostitution in Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford.14 Only this time, it
came to the opposite conclusion. It considered the constitutionality of the
prohibitions on bawdy-houses and communication in public, like in the
Prostitution Reference, as well as the prohibition on living on the avails
of prostitution. Unlike in the Prostitution Reference, the matter was
brought by application and included the benefit of a full record below.
The social climate surrounding prostitution had also significantly
changed.
Justice Himel of the Ontario Superior Court heard the application.
She eschewed the approach of the Manitoba Court of Appeal 20 years
earlier, taking full advantage of her mandate as finder of facts. She
produced a 541-paragraph decision that referred to over 120 cases,
20 statutes and 36 academic authorities and reports. She examined the
legislative history of prostitution in Canada and throughout the world,

12

Reference re Criminal Code (Canada) ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c), [1987] M.J. No. 453, 49
Man. R. (2d) 1 (Man. C.A.), affd [1990] S.C.J. No. 52 (S.C.C.).
13
Prostitution Reference, SCC, supra, note 4, at 1140-41 and 1156-61.
14
Bedford, SCC, supra, note 1.
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reports on the experiences of prostitutes, the harm faced by prostitutes,
and more. She found that:
(1) Prostitutes are at a high risk of being the victims of physical
violence. Street prostitutes, particularly, are “largely the most
vulnerable prostitutes” and “face an alarming amount of violence”.
(2) Working “in-call” from a fixed indoor location is the safest way to
sell sex.
(3) Prostitutes can increase safety by screening clients at an early stage
of a potential transaction and discussing financial terms and use of
condoms or safe houses in advance, by working indoors and using
monitoring such as closed-circuit television or audio-monitoring, by
hiring an assistant, a bodyguard, a driver, or others, and by working
in familiar areas where they are supported by friends and regular
customers.
(4) The prohibitions force prostitutes to decide between their liberty and
their security of the person.15
Justice Himel found that the prohibitions at issue deprived the
applicants of their liberty and security of the person. Relying on her factual
findings and new legal developments, she overturned the Supreme Court’s
Prostitution Reference. The deprivations of the applicants’ liberty and
security of the person were not in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice. The prohibition against bawdy-houses was
overbroad. The prohibition against living on the avails of prostitution
was arbitrary, overbroad and grossly disproportionate. The prohibition
on communicating for the purposes of prostitution was grossly
disproportionate. The section 7 breach was not justified under section 1
of the Charter.16
The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with Himel J., finding a breach
of the applicants’ Charter rights. First, it addressed her decision to
overturn the Supreme Court’s Prostitution Reference. The Court clarified
that there exist two situations where a trial court can reconsider settled
rulings of higher courts: (1) where a new legal issue is raised; and
(2) where there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that
15

Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] O.J. No. 4057, 2010 ONSC 4264, at paras. 300,
301, 331, 361-362 , 421, 427, 432, and 502 (Ont. S.C.J.), vard [2012] O.J. No. 1296 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Bedford, application”].
16
Id., at paras. 445-507. Also see Bedford, SCC, supra, note 1, at paras. 19-24.
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“fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate”.17 Both situations
existed in this case.
Second, the Court clarified that contrary to a previous holding of the
Court, findings of social and legislative fact were now entitled to
deference on appeal.18
Finally, addressing section 7, the Court linked Himel J.’s findings of
social and legislative fact to every step of its analysis. The prohibition on
communications to engage in prostitution, for example, affected the
applicants’ security of the person by not allowing prostitutes “to screen
prospective clients for intoxication or propensity to violence, which can
reduce the risks that they face”.19 This prohibition was grossly
disproportionate to its object of removing the nuisance of prostitution
from the streets (and therefore in violation of a principle of fundamental
justice) because, as the application judge found, “the ability to screen
clients was an ‘essential tool’ to avoiding violent or drunken clients”.20
The Court criticized the Court of Appeal in the case for “erroneously
substitut[ing] its assessment of the evidence for that of the application
judge… This was linked to its error, discussed above, in according too
little deference to the application judge on findings of social and
legislative facts.”21
2. Assisted Suicide
(a) 1993 — Rodriguez
The early 1990s were momentous times for the Supreme Court on
complex social issues. A few years after the Prostitution Reference, the
Court tackled the issue of assisted suicide in Rodriguez v. British
Columbia (Attorney General). Sue Rodriguez, a 42-year-old mother,
suffered from Lou Gehrig’s disease. Her condition was rapidly
deteriorating and she would soon lose the ability to swallow, speak, walk,
move her body without assistance and breathe without a respirator. Her life
expectancy was between two and 14 months. She wished for a doctor to
assist her in dying when she was no longer able to enjoy life, at the time of

17
18
19
20
21

Bedford, SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 42.
Id., at para. 49.
Id., at para. 69.
Id., at para. 148; also see paras. 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 86, 134, 148 and 155.
Id., at para. 154.
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her choosing. She applied to the court for an order that section 241(b) of the
Criminal Code,22 which prohibits the giving of assistance to commit
suicide, be declared invalid on the ground that it infringed her section 7
Charter right.23
Justice Melvin, the trial judge, found that the state had not restricted
Ms. Rodriguez’s right to life. While her illness “may restrict her ability
to implement her decisions”, this did not “amount to an infringement of a
right to life, liberty or security of the person by the state”.24 Section 241(b)
did not breach section 7, 12, or 15(1) of the Charter.
The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with Ms. Rodriguez
that section 241(b) contributed to her distress by preventing her “from
managing her death in the circumstances which she fears will occur”.
The resultant loss of autonomy, physical pain and psychological distress
deprived Ms. Rodriguez of her security of the person under section 7.
As established by the Court in prior cases, the section 7 concept of
security of the person “encompass[es] a notion of personal autonomy
involving, at the very least, control over one’s bodily integrity free from
state interference and freedom from state-imposed psychological and
emotional stress”.25
However, the majority found that this deprivation was in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice. Justice Sopinka extensively
reviewed the history of the provisions, the right to refuse medical care at
the end of life, the legislation of other countries, and the official positions
of various medical associations, which argued against decriminalizing
assisted suicide. He concluded from his review that there existed a
widespread acceptance of a moral or ethical distinction between passive
and active euthanasia; a lack of any “halfway Measure” that could protect
the vulnerable; and a “substantial consensus” in Western countries that a
blanket prohibition was necessary to protect against the slippery slope.
Therefore, to the extent there existed any consensus on the issue, it was
that “human life must be respected and we must be careful not to
undermine the institutions that protect it”. The blanket prohibition
was neither arbitrary nor unfair and did not violate the principles of

22
23
24
25

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
Rodriguez, supra, note 5, at 530-31.
Id., at 534.
Id., at 584 and 587-89.
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fundamental justice.26 The majority also found no violation of section 12
of the Charter.
On section 15(1) of the Charter, while the majority assumed a breach
(as found in Lamer C.J.C.’s dissent), it found this breach was “clearly
saved under s. 1”. Specifically, the “substantial consensus” among
western countries, medical organizations and the Law Reform Commission
established that the protection of individuals against the control of others
over their lives was best achieved through a blanket prohibition against
assisted suicide without exception.27
(b) 2015 — Carter
The Ancient Greeks were onto something. Just as prostitution
returned before the Court in 2010, assisted suicide returned in 2015. The
adjudicative facts in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) were “very
similar” to the facts in Rodriguez. Ms. Taylor, like Ms. Rodriguez, was
dying of Lou Gehrig’s disease. She, like Ms. Rodriguez, wanted the right
to seek a physician’s assistance in dying when her suffering became
intolerable and challenged the constitutionality of section 241(b) of the
Criminal Code.28
The social and legislative facts, however, were quite different. As
found at trial by Smith J.:
(1) The preponderance of evidence from ethicists is that “there is no
ethical distinction between physician-assisted death and other endof-life practices whose outcome is highly likely to be death”.
(2) There is a strong consensus that physician-assisted dying would
be ethical with respect to a “competent, informed, voluntary adult
patient who is grievously ill and suffering symptoms that cannot be
alleviated”, and where the assistance is “clearly consistent with the
patient’s wishes and best interests, and in order to relieve suffering”.
(3) Evidence from countries with regimes that permit physician-assisted
dying revealed that “predicted abuse and disproportionate impact on
vulnerable populations has not materialized”.

26
27
28

Id., at 596-605 and 608.
Id., at 613.
Carter, SCC, supra, note 2, at para. 42.
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(4) There are qualified Canadian physicians who would find it ethical to
assist a patient in dying if that act were not prohibited by law.
(5) Physicians are capable of reliably assessing patient competence,
including in the context of life-and-death decisions, and the risks of
physician-assisted death “can be identified and very substantially
minimized through a carefully-designed system” that imposes strict
limits that are scrupulously monitored and enforced.29
Justice Smith concluded that this new evidence, as well as the
development of the section 7 principles of gross disproportionality and
overbreadth, which had not been identified at the time of the decision in
Rodriguez,30 permitted her to reconsider the constitutionality on the
prohibition on physician-assisted dying.31 She relied on this new
evidence of social and legislative facts to overturn the Supreme Court’s
precedent, concluding that the prohibition deprived the applicants of their
rights to life, to liberty and to security of the person. This deprivation
was not in accordance with the principle of overbreadth, since the
evidence showed that a system with properly designed and administered
safeguards offered a less restrictive means of reaching the government’s
objective. Nor was it in accordance with the principle of gross
disproportionality. The breach of section 7 could not be justified under
section 1.32
Like in Bedford, the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s decision
to overturn its precedent in Rodriguez, largely on the basis of the new
social and legislative facts found by the trial court and developments in
the law since Rodriguez. On the legal issue, the Court accepted that the
law relating to overbreadth and gross disproportionality “had materially
advanced since Rodriguez”.33
On the evidentiary issue, the record at trial contained evidence that,
if accepted, was capable of undermining each of the majority’s factual
conclusions in Rodriguez. While the object of section 241(b) is to
29
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] B.C.J. No. 1196, 2012 BCSC 886, at paras. 319,
335, 358, 684, 798, 815, 831, 843, and 883 (B.C.S.C.), revd [2013] B.C.J. No. 2227 (B.C.C.A.)
[hereinafter “Carter, trial”]
30
The principle of overbreadth was identified in R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101,
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, at 790-94 (S.C.C.), affg [1992] B.C.J. No. 2596 (B.C.C.A.), and the principle
of gross disproportionality was fleshed out in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79,
2003 SCC 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 143 (S.C.C.), affg [2000] B.C.J. No. 1095 (B.C.C.A.).
31
See Carter, SCC, supra, note 2, at para. 28.
32
Carter, trial, supra, note 29, at paras. 1281-1283, 1367, 1378-1383.
33
Carter, SCC, supra, note 2, at paras. 44-46.
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“prevent[] vulnerable persons from being induced to commit suicide at a
time of weakness”, the evidence revealed that “the law catches people
outside this class”, that is who are not vulnerable. According to the
Court, “[i]t follows that the limitation on their rights is in at least some
cases not connected to the objective of protecting vulnerable persons”.
In addition, at the section 1 stage, the new evidence of social and
legislative facts demonstrated that the blanket prohibition against
assisted-suicide in section 241(b) was not minimally impairing. Evidence
from “scientists, medical practitioners, and others who were familiar
with end-of-life decision-making in Canada and abroad” confirmed that a
permissive regime “with properly designed and administered safeguards”
could protect vulnerable people from abuse and error. Properly qualified
and experienced physicians were able “to reliably assess patient
competence and voluntariness” to ensure that these patients were truly
consenting to die.34
In response to the Attorney General of Canada’s argument that the
trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in concluding that
safeguards would minimize the risk associated with assisted dying, the
Supreme Court stated simply that “[i]n our view, Canada has not
established that the trial judge’s conclusion on this point is unsupported,
arbitrary, insufficiently precise or otherwise in error. At most, Canada’s
criticisms amount to ‘pointing out conflicting evidence’, which is not
sufficient to establish a palpable and overriding error … . We see no
reason to reject the conclusions drawn by the trial judge. They were
reasonable and open to her on the record.” In response to anecdotal
examples of cases abroad meant to show that Canada would descend the
slippery slope into euthanasia and condoned murder, the Supreme Court
noted “anecdotal examples of systems that work well. The resolution of
the issue before us falls to be resolved not by competing anecdotes, but
by the evidence. The trial judge, after an exhaustive review of the
evidence, rejected the argument that adoption of a regulatory regime
would initiate a descent down a slippery slope into homicide.”35
Churchill stated that “those who fail to learn from history are
doomed to repeat it”. Although the Supreme Court had dismissed similar
constitutional challenges in the Prostitution Reference and Rodriguez,
the applicants Carter and Bedford learned from history. They ensured to
put before the Court a record sufficient to prove their harm and suffering,
34
35

Id., at paras. 47, 73-78, 86, and 104-107.
Id., at paras. 109 and 120.
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as well as the social and legislative facts necessary to prove the
incoherence of the legislative regime that brought about this harm. Once
the trial judges decided to strike down the prostitution and assistedsuicide regimes, and in light of the Supreme Court’s own doctrine that
findings of social and legislative facts warrant deference, the results in
Carter and Bedford at the Supreme Court appeared preordained.
3. Legislative Bilingualism
(a) 1988 — Mercure
The story of a constitutional right to legislative bilingualism in
Alberta and Saskatchewan begins in much the same way. In 1988, in
R. v. Mercure, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to decide whether
the right to legislative bilingualism in section 110 of the North-West
Territories Act36 applied in Saskatchewan (and in Alberta, since both
provinces were in a similar position) and, if it did, whether it was a
constitutional right.37 Section 110 provides as follows:
110. Either the English or the French language may be used by any
person in the debates of the Legislative Assembly of the Territories and
in the proceedings before the courts; and both those languages shall be
used in the records and journals of such Assembly; and all ordinances
made under this Act shall be printed in both those languages …38

At trial, without the benefit of social and legislative evidence,
Deshaye P.C.J. concluded that section 110 still applied in Saskatchewan;
however, its scope was restricted: while litigants could address the court
in French and be provided with an interpreter, statutes were not required
to be printed in French.39
Writing for the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada, La Forest J.
agreed with Deshaye P.C.J., that section 110 had been in effect in
Saskatchewan since its inception (though the province had never
respected it); and that section 110 continued in operation in the province
to this day. On a plain reading of its terms, section 110 entitled a litigant

36

R.S.C. 1886, c. 50.
Mercure, SCC, supra, note 6, at 247-48.
38
North-West Territories Act, supra, note 36, at s. 110.
39
Mercure v. Saskatchewan, [1981] S.J. No. 978, [1981] 4 W.W.R. 435, at paras. 10-23
(Sask. Prov. Ct.), affd [1985] S.J. No. 766 (Sask. C.A.).
37
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to speak French before the courts in Saskatchewan, but not to be
understood. It also required Saskatchewan’s statutes to be enacted,
printed, and published in English and French. Section 110 was not a
constitutional provision, however, meaning that the legislature could
repeal it through an ordinary Act: “Parliament knew full well how to
[constitutionally] entrench a provision if it wished to do so, namely, by
expressly providing for language rights in the Saskatchewan Act as it did
in the case of s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870”.40
While of the opinion that this case could be “resolved simply by
the application of the ordinary principles of statutory construction”,
La Forest J. performed perfunctory additional research of social and
legislative facts to support his reasoning. He was criticized for doing so
by Estey J., who noted in his dissent that the record before the Court did
not include these “historical opinions and comments”. Justice Estey did
appear to envision, however, that section 110 of the North-West Territories
Act could be elevated to constitutional status if there existed a proper
“factual” and “statutory” base to warrant this conclusion.41
(b) 2015 — Caron
Just as the Ancient Greeks would have predicted, this proper factual
and statutory base was placed before the Court two decades later, with
the hearing of Caron v. Alberta in 2015.42 At issue in this case, like in
Mercure, was the constitutionality of legislative bilingualism in
Saskatchewan and Alberta.43 This time, however, following the parallels
established in Bedford and Carter, the case was argued on a full trial
record, with ample evidence of social and legislative facts and in the
context of a new legal framework.
In Mercure, the claimant had argued that section 110 of the North-West
Territories Act was a constitutional provision. In Caron, however,
the claimant argued that as early as 1867, Parliament promised the
Francophone Métis it would provide for legislative bilingualism in all the
40

Mercure, SCC, supra, note 6, at 255 and 257-71.
Id., at 248 (La Forest J.) and 294-95, 321 and 325 (Estey J., dissenting).
42
I acted as counsel for the Fédération des associations de juristes d’expression française de
common law inc., an intervener before the Supreme Court on the case, which argued in favour of a
constitutional right to legislative bilingualism.
43
Caron concerned Alberta’s constitutional obligations while Mercure concerned
Saskatchewan’s, but the historical and legislative framework surrounding the creation of both provinces
was almost identical.
41
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territories covering modern-day Saskatchewan and Alberta, as a way to
ensure peaceful annexation of these territories. The British and Canadian
governments then constitutionally entrenched this promise in the 1870
Rupert’s Land and North-Western Territory Order and in the 1869 Royal
Proclamation.44
The legal context relating to language rights had significantly
evolved since Mercure. Mercure continued a line of cases in the late
1980s that interpreted language rights restrictively.45 In Société des
Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Association of Parents for
Fairness in Education, the leading case in this line, the Supreme Court
indicated that language rights were a limited and precise group of rights
resulting from “political compromise”. They were unlike the “legal rights …
expressed in s. 7 of the Charter” and should therefore be interpreted with
“restraint”. Progression towards equality of official languages was a goal
to be pursued only through the legislative process, not the courts.46
This restrictive interpretation of language rights was decisively
overturned in 1999 by the Supreme Court in R. v. Beaulac. Writing for
the majority, Bastarache J. confirmed that like all other constitutional
rights, language rights must in all cases be interpreted purposively.
To the extent Société des Acadiens stood for a restrictive interpretation of
language rights, “it is to be rejected”.47
Between 1988 and 2015, the legal landscape also evolved in
one other important respect. In Mercure, the Court had rejected the
suggestion that section 110 of the North-West Territories Act had been
implicitly entrenched, noting that “Parliament knew full well how to
[constitutionally] entrench a provision if it wished to do so”.48 In later
decisions such as the Nadon decision and the Senate Reference, however,
the Court came to accept that even where Parliament failed to expressly
constitutionally entrench a provision, the provision might implicitly be
44
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constitutionally entrenched in instances where the historical, social, and
philosophical context favoured entrenchment.49
The most significant change since Mercure, however, was the
factual-historical record that the claimants in Caron put before the Court.
As a result, unlike in Mercure, the trial court in Caron was able to
extensively assess the historical facts surrounding the purchase of
Rupert’s Land and the creation of the North-West Territories — i.e., the
“context” required in modern-day constitutional interpretation. Justice
Wenden heard at trial the evidence of eight experts in history, sociology,
sociolinguistics and political science. The trial lasted 89 days and
resulted in 9,164 pages of transcripts, 93 exhibits, and a 575-paragraph
decision. Justice Wenden made several findings of social and legislative
facts:
(1) On December 16 and 17, 1867, preparing for its eventual annexation
of Rupert’s Land and the North-West Territories [together, the
“Territories”], Parliament presented an address to the Queen, in
which it undertook to “provide that the legal rights of any
corporation, company, or individual within the same shall be
respected” [the “1867 Address”].50 The content of these rights was
not fleshed out.
(2) As annexation approached, Canada indicated it could accept transfer
only if “quiet possession can be given”. Negotiations with the Métis
were required to ensure that they would join Canada willingly and
would not scale up the ongoing political uprising.51
(3) The delegates for the Territories agreed that legislative bilingualism
was a non-negotiable condition of their entry into Canada.52 They
never wavered.
(4) Representatives of the British and Canadian governments did not
consider legislative bilingualism anywhere in the Territories to be
contentious, and consistently promised it to the delegates. Governor
General John Young issued a Royal Proclamation in 1869, stating
49
Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 SCC 21, [2014]
1 S.C.R. 433, at paras. 19 and 76-103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nadon”]; Reference re Senate Reform,
[2014] S.C.J. No. 32, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704, at para. 25 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Senate
Reference”].
50
Caron, trial, supra, note 44, at para. 492.
51
Id., at paras. 462-463; also see Caron, SCC, supra, note 3, at paras. 179-183 (dissent).
52
Id., at paras. 267-275; also see Caron, SCC, supra, note 3, at paras. 168-178 (dissent).

(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CARON, CARTER AND BEDFORD

277

that upon annexation, “all your civil and religious rights and
privileges will be respected”. The Royal Proclamation was issued at
the order of the Queen in order to reassure the inhabitants that their
language rights including legislative and judicial bilingualism would
be respected, and thereby quell unrest in the territories. As Canadian
representative Donald Smith explained to the delegates, the propriety
of legislative bilingualism “is so evident that it will unquestionably
be provided for”.53
(5) Conversely, there was no evidence that demands for legislative
bilingualism anywhere in the Territories was ever opposed, or that
the delegates somehow accepted the institution of legislative
bilingualism in Manitoba only. Nor would it have made sense, seeing
as French was the “Language of the Country” and a language of the
Assiniboia Council and Court throughout the Territories (not only in
the Red River Colony). Language rights throughout the Territories
were accepted as a given.54
(6) Immediately after annexation, the entire Territories continued to be
governed bilingually. In 1877, the existing practice of legislative
bilingualism was codified in section 110 of The North-West
Territories Act.55
Ultimately, Wenden J. concluded that in light of the historical
context, the civil and religious rights guaranteed by the 1869 Royal
Proclamation, including legislative bilingualism, were constitutionally
protected.
The majority of the Supreme Court disagreed, finding no constitutional
right to legislative bilingualism: “It has never been the case in our
constitutional history that a right to legislative bilingualism was
constitutionalized by inference through the vehicle of the words ‘legal
rights’. The words in the 1867 Address cannot support a constitutional
guarantee of legislative bilingualism in the province of Alberta. Parliament
knew how to entrench language rights and did so in the Manitoba Act,
1870 but not in the 1867 Address.” Unlike in Bedford and Carter, the

53

Id., at paras. 383, 396 and 429-488; also see Caron, SCC, supra, note 3, at paras. 184-195

(dissent).
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Id., at paras. 323-367; also see Caron, SCC, supra, note 3, at paras. 196-205 (dissent).

278

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)

majority of the Court emphasized the “important element of context to
bear in mind that if the appellants are right, the result reached by the
Court in Mercure is clearly wrong. The stability of our constitutional law
counsels against accepting such a proposition too readily.”56
The majority purported to “take no issue with the factual findings of
the provincial court judge” — only with his legal conclusions. In reality,
the majority found its own facts:
(1) The representatives of the Territories never considered that the
promise to respect “legal rights” referred to linguistic rights.
(2) Parliamentary debates show that the promise to respect legal rights in
the 1867 Address did not refer to linguistic rights.
(3) Contemporary evidence shows that the parties thought that linguistic
rights were addressed in the Manitoba Act, 1870 but not in the 1870
Order.
(4) There is no evidence that the 1867 Address embodied the compromise
reached in 1870.
(5) The events following annexation show that no one involved thought
there had been any guarantee of legislative bilingualism in 1870.
(6) Read in context, the Royal Proclamation did not contain a promise to
guarantee legislative bilingualism.57
These are findings of social and legislative fact, and they all directly
contradicted the findings of the trial judge.58
The dissent, on the other hand, would have confirmed the trial
judge’s findings of fact and found a constitutional right to legislative
bilingualism. Emphasizing that the Constitution must be interpreted “in
light of its historical, philosophical and linguistic context”, the dissent
explained that, “[i]n short, the historical record clearly shows that there
was an agreement to protect legislative bilingualism throughout the
annexed territories. This agreement was constitutionally enshrined in
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the Rupert’s Land and North-Western Territory Order… — which
incorporated the 1867 Address — as is confirmed by the events of
that period.”59

III. PLUS ÇA CHANGE: BACK TO A RESTRICTIVE
INTERPRETATION OF LANGUAGE RIGHTS
The Supreme Court has traditionally accorded deference to the trial
judge’s findings on the “adjudicative” facts of a case — “who did what,
where, when, how and with what motive or intent”.60 Prior to Bedford,
however, this deference did not extend to the assessment of “social and
legislative” facts in a case. These types of facts arise in the law-making
process and require the legislature or a court “to assess complex social
science evidence and to draw general conclusions concerning the effect
of legal rules on human behaviour”.61 They are the facts involved “in
deciding questions of law or policy”.62 As McLachlin J. (as she then was)
explained in RJR-MacDonald, “appellate courts are not bound by the
trial judge’s findings in respect of social science evidence”.63
This broad discretion in the treatment of social and legislative facts
meant that litigants and commentators were “basically left in the dark as
to how social facts actually find their way into judicial reasoning”.64
In the words of Danielle Pinard, facts were:
… refused, ignored, called for, wished for, found in evidence, not
found in evidence, imagined, invented, assumed, judicially noticed,
reasoned, or taken for granted. They are treated in an unpredictable
59

Caron, SCC, supra, note 3, at paras. 115-119 and 141.
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Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987), at 215.
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Id., at para. 79 (per La Forest J., dissenting but not on this point); also see Ann
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at 114 and 123.
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way. And yet they are extremely useful, for their presence or their
absence, and their uncertainty or their insufficiency is used to justify
judgments. It is not the fault of the law, it is not the fault of the judges,
it is the fault of the facts.65

The Court allegedly sought to change this approach in Bedford,
eliminating the distinction between “adjudicative” and “social and
legislative” facts and according full deference to the trial judge’s findings
of social and legislative facts in constitutional challenges. By allowing
the trial judge to overturn a Supreme Court precedent in that case, the
Court strongly signalled that trial judges would be empowered to support
their reasoning using social and legislative facts derived from the social
sciences. Ideally, this meant that litigants could look forward to more
predictability, transparency and fairness in both trial and Supreme Court
constitutional decisions. If experts have the science to help judges make
better decisions, why not let them use it?
Carter confirmed the Court’s new deferential and empirical
approach.
In Caron, however, the Court ignored this new approach. The Court
claims that the trial judge’s factual findings were ultimately irrelevant to
the result, which came down to the fact that “Parliament knew how to
entrench language rights”, but chose not to do so.66 But this assumes a
formalistic interpretation of constitutional rights, which the Court no
longer favours. In the Senate Reference, for example, the Court noted
that “[t]he rules of constitutional interpretation require that constitutional
documents be interpreted in a broad and purposive manner and placed in
their proper linguistic, philosophic, and historical contexts.”67 In Nadon,
the Court explained that the Court must review the “political and social
consensus at the time” to determine whether a right is “an essential part
of Canada’s constitutional architecture”.68 This is what the trial judge did
in Caron, finding that legislative bilingualism was without a doubt part
of the political and social consensus at the time. A broad interpretation of
the 1867 Address and the Royal Proclamation, particularly in light of the
historical context, certainly suggested that civil rights included
legislative bilingualism. So why was Caron any different from these
cases, let alone the two section 7 Charter cases discussed above?
65
66
67
68
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A first possibility is the Court’s continued underlying unease with
language rights. In Société des Acadiens, the Court promoted a restrictive
interpretation of language rights, which resulted from “political
compromise”, as opposed to the “legal rights … expressed in s. 7 of the
Charter”.69 The Supreme Court formally resiled from this position in
Beaulac, accepting that “[l]anguage rights must in all cases be
interpreted purposively, in a manner consistent with the preservation and
development of official language communities in Canada.” In that case,
attempting once and for all to place language rights on equal footing with
other constitutional rights, Bastarache J. noted that “a political
compromise also led to the adoption of ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.” He
explained that “there is no contradiction between protecting individual
liberty and personal dignity and the wider objective of recognizing the
rights of official language communities.”70
Justice Bastarache only succeeded in part. The Court has adopted an
expansive interpretation of language rights in the context of minoritylanguage education under section 23 of the Charter.71 But in other
language rights contexts, Beaulac has not held up to its promise. Heard a
few years after Beaulac, Charlebois v. Saint John (City) reverted to a
restrictive and formalistic interpretation of language rights (with
Bastarache J. in dissent), deciding that Charter values have no role to
play in the interpretation of the quasi-constitutional Official Languages
Act unless the Act contains ambiguities.72 Likewise, in Conseil scolaire
francophone, the Court dismissed the possibility that the official
language rights enshrined in the Charter could implicitly modify
restrictive pre-Charter language provisions.73 Neither institutional nor
69
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legislative bilingualism since Beaulac have benefited from the broad and
purposive interpretation to which they are apparently entitled.
The majority in Caron states that “linguistic rights have always been
dealt with expressly from the beginning of our constitutional history”.74
This statement is clearly wrong. For example, the Court now accepts
that the right to instruction under section 23 of the Charter includes an
implied right for the minority-community to manage their own
educational facilities.75 More troubling, however, is that this discourse
attempts to set language rights apart from other constitutional rights, to
be interpreted more restrictively. This is the approach ostensibly rejected
in Beaulac.
The majority also argues that the creation of rights is different from
the interpretation of rights: “The Court must generously interpret
constitutional linguistic rights, not create them.”76 But at issue in
Caron was the interpretation of the promise in the 1867 Address, which
had undeniably been incorporated into the 1870 Rupert’s Land and
North-Western Territory Order (a constitutional document). And in any
event, on the Court’s own recent jurisprudence, there’s little foundation
for a clear-cut distinction between the creation and the interpretation
of constitutional rights. In the mishmash of written documents and
unwritten principles that create the Canadian constitutional architecture,
it is not always clear whether a right or guarantee has been implicitly
constitutionalized. That very issue requires a broad and purposive
assessment of the historical and philosophical context of the provision.
To interpret the scope of legislative and institutional bilingualism,
the Court might also be expected to consider the constitutional principle
for the protection of minorities. In the Reference re Secession of Quebec,
the Court explained that “the protection of minority rights was clearly an
essential consideration in the design of our constitutional structure even
at the time of Confederation … The principle of protecting minority
rights continues to exercise influence in the operation and interpretation
of our Constitution.” The principle ought also to be “invested with a
powerful normative force”.77 Yet instead of drawing upon this principle
to interpret language rights, the Court has often held up the principle of
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“federalism” into its path. In Conseil scolaire francophone, the Court
noted that “while it is true that the Charter reflects the importance of
language rights, it also reflects the importance of respect for the
constitutional powers of the provinces … [I]t is not inconsistent with
Charter values for the British Columbia legislature to restrict the
language of court proceedings in the province to English.”78 In Caron,
the Court similarly noted that “[w]e … cannot … allow the pursuit of
language rights to trample on areas of clear provincial legislative
jurisdiction.”79
Why has the principle of federalism consistently trumped the
principle for the protection of minorities? Perhaps because the Court
wants to ensure that new constitutional rights will not be created with
limited territorial application. While the Supreme Court has proved itself
willing to significantly expand (if not outright create) rights of universal
application — for example in the context of s. 7, 15, or 23 — it has been
much less inclined to create rights that apply in only one or two provinces.
That said, it is particularly ironic that the principle of federalism was
used as a bulwark against the principle for the protection of minorities in
Caron, since the evidence accepted by the trial judge revealed that the
Francophone Métis in the Territories would not have accepted to join the
Canadian confederation without a firm belief that their language rights
would be protected. If the principle for the protection of minorities
cannot prevail in Caron — a case about the value of a historical promise
to a minority-language group in order to secure its willingness to join the
Canadian confederation — it seems difficult to envision a situation
where the Court will grant it normative force. The irony is extended
because the Constitution does not even expressly award to the provinces
jurisdiction over language; rather this jurisdiction is an implicit corollary
of their power to manage their other express fields of jurisdiction.
Yet according to the Court, only an express constitutional provision
could modify the province’s implicit power over language.
While the Court in the Charter era has increasingly relied on
“context” to resolve constitutional claims,80 this context is unwelcome in
the interpretation of legislative and institutional bilingualism. What is left
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is a dry, formal and strictly textual approach, one where social and
legislative facts are irrelevant. Unless a constitutional provision clearly
sets out a language obligation for government, the courts have no role to
play. As the Court explained it in Société des Acadiens, progression
towards equality of official languages is a goal to be pursued through the
legislative process only, not the courts.81 This approach is reminiscent of
the way the courts refused to protect minority-language education rights
between Confederation and the turn of the 20th century because they
were not expressly provided.82
While this restrictive approach also calls to mind some criticisms of
the Court’s interpretation of Aboriginal rights,83 this may be changing.
Indeed, in Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development),
the Court expansively interpreted section 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867, using the historical, philosophical, and linguistic contexts “to establish
that ‘Indians’ in s. 91(24) includes all Aboriginal peoples, including
non-status Indians and Métis”.84 Paradoxically, the “historical” and
“philosophical” context used by the trial judge (and accepted by the
Supreme Court) in Daniels was the same as in Caron, that is, the
understanding that a good relationship with the Métis, who occupied
much of the Territories pre-annexation, “was required” for the Canadian
government to realize its goals.85 While this context led to an expansive
interpretation of the Constitution in Daniels, it did not in Caron (which
came out a mere five months earlier). The Court determined that the
Canadian government’s promise to the Métis (the promise to “honour the
obligations” inherited from Britain)86 in Daniels had constitutional value;
yet its language promises to the Métis in Caron did not.
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A second possible reason for the Supreme Court’s refusal to defer to
trial facts in Caron is a discomfort with the use of “historical facts” to
grant, expand, or reinterpret constitutional rights. In Bedford, the Court
described social and legislative facts as “facts about society at large,
established by complex social science evidence”.87 It is clear that this
definition in theory encompasses the historical facts found by the trial
judge in Caron, for example the decision of the British to issue the 1869
Royal Proclamation to reassure the inhabitants of the Territories that
their language rights would be respected and thereby quell unrest, or the
understanding of the delegates of the inhabitants of the Territories
(and not just the Red River Colony) that legislative bilingualism was a
non-negotiable condition of their entry into Canada.88
Yet it is undeniable that historical facts are different and used for
different purposes in constitutional challenges than other social and
legislative facts. Typically, social and legislative facts are used by the
Court to provide a window into society’s beliefs and status or destabilize
current assumptions at that moment in time.89 For example, sociologists
generate evidence to assess how a particular criminal law “is actually
implemented in particular situations” or how a criminal justice system
“can reproduce or create social inequality”. The result is an “attempt to
situate phenomena in their social, cultural, and political environs, and to
a lesser extent in their historical and economic contexts”.90
In the Prostitution Reference, the Court used social facts about
morality and the “nuisances” caused by public solicitation of prostitutes.91
In Rodriguez, it referred to the lack of any “halfway Measure” that could
protect the vulnerable if assisted-suicide was decriminalized and the
widespread acceptance of a moral or ethical distinction between passive
and active euthanasia.92 These social facts reflected the evidence available
to the Court at the time; they probably also reflected where society stood on
these issues.
By the time Bedford and Carter came around, society had changed.
At trial in Bedford, Himel J. thoroughly canvassed enormous quantities
87
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of social science evidence produced since the Prostitution Reference had
been decided in 1990 that allowed her to reframe the issue in a different
way. She noted, for example, that “[a]lthough undoubtedly present in
1990, the issue of harm faced by prostitutes is forefront in the present
case, and supported by two decades of new research”.93 In Carter, Smith J.
noted that the societal consensus on end-of-life practices in Canada and
the world had changed. Furthermore, evidence from other countries with
assisted-suicide revealed that “predicted abuse and disproportionate
impact on vulnerable populations has not materialized”.94 This new
empirical evidence confirmed to the trial judges that society had changed
in a way that warranted expanding section 7 Charter rights. For the
Supreme Court, these findings of fact were reliable as objective
indicators, since the trial judges had sat through numerous days of trial
with numerous expert witnesses from opposite perspectives. The
evidence was used to bring constitutional legal norms in line with
society’s beliefs and mores.
Historical facts hold these characteristics to an extent. But unlike
other social sciences facts, they are not necessarily used to place
phenomena within their modern-day social, cultural and political
environs, or to bring constitutional norms in line with society’s beliefs.
Rather, they are used to expand the class of community-based
constitutional rights based on political compromises, such as those of
linguistic minorities and First Nations. They do so by undermining the
modern-day constitutional understanding (and, generally, the privileged
status of the majority), with reference to the social, cultural and political
environs of the past. Historical facts don’t lead judges to say: “Society
has evolved so let’s change the law.” They lead judges to say: “We had it
all wrong in the first place so let’s change the law.” Where the majority
of society does not agree it “had it all wrong in the first place”, however,
it becomes difficult for a judge to use a revisionary understanding of
history to change the law.95
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In Caron, the historical evidence established that although our
current constitutional understanding treats Alberta as constitutionally
unilingual (and has treated Alberta as such for its entire existence), it is
historically wrong: when Canada annexed the Territories, it guaranteed
legislative bilingualism to its Francophone community. Today’s FrancoAlbertan community, although small in number, ought to have the same
privileged status as the Anglophone majority. This is an easy argument
for Franco-Albertans to accept, but much more difficult for AngloAlbertans, particularly where the express constitutional provisions
suggest otherwise. Likewise, in some Aboriginal cases, historical facts
are used to show that today’s land use and distribution is the product of a
flawed understanding of the historical relationship between Aboriginals
and non-Aboriginals. For Aboriginal communities, this argument is
appealing; but for non-Aboriginal communities, accepting this argument
has potentially dramatic consequences.96
It may be for this reason that, outside the section 23 Charter context,
the Supreme Court grants historically-based Francophone claims only
where there also exists an express and clear legal provision establishing
the minority’s constitutional right. This was the case in the Reference re
Manitoba Language Rights, where the Supreme Court accepted that an
express constitutional provision mandating legislative bilingualism in
Manitoba did in fact mandate legislative bilingualism in Manitoba.97
(The fact a Supreme Court of Canada decision was even needed on this
basic issue reveals a lot about the uphill task that less obvious
Francophone claims may face.) In Caron, where the historical facts
sought to prove the existence of an implicit constitutional right, the Court
was not comfortable deferring to the facts and granting the claim.
It is easier to overturn a decision, like in Bedford or Carter, because
the social and legislative facts show that society has changed, than it is to
overturn a decision, like in Caron, because the historical facts show that
society had it wrong and continues to have it wrong. This is true
particularly where, like in Caron, the right to legislative bilingualism
in Alberta had already been effectively extinct for over a century.
The Court perceives its job as fixing today’s inequities, not as ensuring

96
In fact, McHugh, id., Chapters 3 and 5, notes that while historical facts were critical to
establish the modern day conception of Aboriginal title, the last several years of litigation have not
seen the expected breakthroughs, despite the development of an entire industry devoted to the
determination of historical facts.
97
Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] S.C.J. No. 36, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.).
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that 100-year-old long-forgotten promises are reinstated. Paraphrasing
the Court, this last objective is better left to the political sphere. Sadly, in
Caron, it became easier to deny the existence of a constitutional
language right because this right had historically been ignored.98

IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s increased reliance on social sciences evidence
has made constitutional litigation more expensive for litigants. A trial
with competing experts from sociology, psychology and history is more
expensive than a trial without this evidence. However, by forcing appeal
courts to defer to all of the trial judge’s factual conclusions, including
conclusions of social and legislative fact, the Court has also sought to
make justice more transparent and predictable. The trade-off may be
worth it if it results in better decision-making.
The Caron decision suggests that these goals are still aspirational,
and that the Court will continue to interpret its own social and legislative
facts in some instances. In Caron, the Court did not defer to trial facts,
presumably because it could not agree with the result — it’s easier to
defer on issues of social rights than on issues of minority-language
bilingualism in Alberta. But if the Court’s new approach to deference is
to survive, the Court will need to defer even in cases where it disagrees
with the legal implications. Otherwise, litigation will be at once more
expensive and less predictable.

98

Conversely, in Daniels, supra, note 84, the Court may have come to a different
conclusion largely because the federal government had historically legislated over the Métis as
“Indians” and had appeared to do so in the belief it was acting within its constitutional authority (at
paras. 27-33).

